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Special Comment
Self-Defense in Kentucky- A Need for
Clarification or Revision
By WILLIAM S. COOPER* AND ROBERT G. LAwsON**
I
On August 3, 1985, a quarrel developed between Gerald
Miller and his wife-a dispute which surfaced near the end of
Miller's two-day drunken binge.' This quarrel occurred on Floyd
Butler's property Butler was present and got caught in the
argument. Miller was a "thirty-three-year-old muscled-up man"; 2
Butler was fifty-seven years old and relatively frail. The two
men had been neighbors and good friends for several years. At
some point during the quarrel, however, Miller became angry
with his friend and threatened Butler with bodily harm. He had
no weapon on his person, made no effort to carry out the threat,
and left the Butler property without further incident.
Later in the day, ostensibly to apologize for his previous
conduct, Miller returned to the scene of the earlier threat. During
Miller's absence, Butler obtained a .22 rifle, loaded it with shells,
and had it handy Upon arrival, Miller got out of his car, offered
to apologize, and extended his hand. Butler grabbed the loaded
rifle and instructed Miller to come no closer With his hand
* Circuit Judge, Hardin County, Kentucky. B.A., University of Kentucky, 1963;
J.D., University of Kentucky, 1970.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S., Berea College, 1960;
J.D., University of Kentucky, 1963.
1 The facts of this narrative derive from the recollection and notes of Judge
Cooper, the presiding judge of the Butler trial. Commonwealth v. Butler, No. 85-CR-
68 (Cir. Ct. Hardin County, Ky. Feb. 20, 1986) (judgment upon jury verdict without
written opinion).
Judge Cooper recorded this statement in his notes from the trial testimony of
Floyd Butler.
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extended, Miller took two steps forward. Butler shot Miller three
times-twice in the chest and once in the back. In a subsequent
trial for murder,3 Butler said two important things about his
actions: (i) he believed that Miller meant to beat or shoot him
with the gun, and (ii) he intended only to stop Miller by shooting
him in the legs and did not intend to kill him.
The circumstances of this homicide combine with Butler's
testimony to present a very complicated legal problem. The
complexity results not so much from the intricacies of the law
of homicide and self-defense but rather from the need to extract
the factual truth from a multitude of possibilities. Did Butler
intend to kill Miller (as the circumstances indicate) or did he
lack such an intent (as he asserted in his testimony)? If Butler
lacked the intent to kill, did he intend to cause serious bodily
injury to Miller? If Butler lacked the intent to kill or the intent
to cause serious bodily injury, did he consciously disregard an
unreasonable risk of causing death when he took action against
Miller? Did he fail to perceive an unreasonable risk of death
under circumstances constituting a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct of a reasonable person? Did Butler really
believe he was at risk of death or serious bodily injury at Miller's
hands? Did he believe that killing or seriously injuring Miller
was necessary to protect his own life or limb? Did he act under
a mistaken belief in the need to protect himself? Did he con-
sciously disregard a substantial risk that he was mistaken in his
belief in the need for self-protection? Did Butler fail to perceive
a substantial risk that he was mistaken in his belief?
The multitude of possible factual truths creates a complexity
that is inherent in homicide and self-defense cases. Butler's
assertion that he did not intend to kill Miller creates a need for
jury instructions on every homicide offense in the law. His
assertion that he acted in self-defense adds a layer of difficulty
to the case, and the possibility that he acted under a mistaken
belief in the need for self-protection further complicates the
issues. Because this complexity is inherent in the justice system,
there exists no way to convert cases such as this into elementary
exercises for juries. Because of its magnitude, the system has
little capacity to absorb unnecessary complexity or to tolerate
much conceptual confusion.
I Butler, No. 85-CR-68.
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The Butler trial, which occurred in January of 1986, leaves
no doubt that Kentucky has pushed the system beyond the limit
of its tolerance for complexity and confusion. It also leaves no
doubt that there exists a critical need to clarify or to revise the
Kentucky law of self-defense. A demonstration of this need and
a description of its nature are the principal objectives of this
Special Comment. To accomplish these objectives, it is necessary
to provide some information about the recent history of homi-
cide and self-defense in Kentucky and to describe some impor-
tant recent interpretations of this law by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky. Only with this information as background can one
appreciate the significance of Floyd Butler's trial.
2
Prior to 1962, Kentucky had two general categories' of stat-
utory homicide: murder' and voluntary manslaughter. 6 The ap-
plicable statutes provided only a range of penalties and deferred
to the common law for the definition of each crime. Murder
was a homicide committed intentionally and with malice; 7 vol-
untary manslaughter was an intentional killing "in a sudden
affray or in [a] sudden heat and passion. ' 8 At this time, the
offense of involuntary manslaughter existed entirely as a com-
mon-law crime that was punishable only as a misdemeanor. 9
This third general homicide category was an unintentional killing
either resulting from carelessness or during the commission of
an unlawful act.10
In 1962, the Kentucky General Assembly converted common-
4 Other categories defining specific types of homicide existed. E.g., Ky. REV.
STAT. § 435.025 (1959) (vehicular homicide); id. at § 435.030 (homicide occurring in the
course of criminal syndicalism or sedition); id. at § 435.040 (homicide occurring in the
course of an abortion); id. at § 435.050 (homicide occurring in the course of a striking,
a stabbing, or a shooting); id. at § 435.060 (homicide or injury resulting from the
obstruction of a road).
Id. at § 435.010.
6 Id. at § 435.020.
7 See 3 0. STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN KENTUCKY § 868 (1957).
Commonwealth v. Mosser, 118 S.W. 915, 915 (Ky. 1909).
See KY. REv. STAT. § 431.075 (1959) ("Any person convicted of a common-law
offense, the penalty for which is not otherwise provided by statute shall be imprisoned
in the county jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum not exceeding
five thousand dollars or both.").
10 See Spriggs v. Corfmonwealth, 68 S.W. 1087 (Ky. 1902); Trimble v. Common-
wealth, 78 Ky. 176 (1879).
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law involuntary manslaughter into a statutory crime11 creating
two degrees of the offense. Involuntary manslaughter in the first
degree was a felony defined as an unintentional killing caused
"by an act creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily
injury as to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of
human life according to the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man under the circumstances.' ' 2 Involuntary manslaughter in
the second degree was a misdemeanor defined as an uninten-
tional killing caused "by reckless conduct according to the stand-
ard of conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances.' 13
The 1962 enactment left the other two general homicide offenses
intact, resolved some confusion about the scope of involuntary
manslaughter as it had existed at common law,' 4 and removed
simple negligence from the realm of criminal culpability for
homicide. '5
Unlike homicide, the Kentucky law of self-defense took shape
in the early days of common law and changed very little there-
after. Under this law, a defendant charged with homicide was
entitled to exoneration upon a showing that (1) he believed that
the conduct of the victim posed an imminent threat of death or
of serious bodily injury to him; (2) he believed that use of deadly
physical force was necessary to avert that threat; and (3) he had
reasonable grounds to entertain the beliefs that compelled him
1 Ky. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 435.022 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970) [hereinafter KRS] (codified
the 1962 Act), repealed by An Act Relating to the Kentucky Penal Code, ch. 406, §
336, 1974 Ky. Acts 889.
12 Id. at § 435.022(1).
" Id. at § 435.022(2).
, See Jones v. Commonwealth, 281 S.W. 164 (Ky. 1926), overruled on other
grounds, Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852, 855-56 (Ky. 1951). "[T]o constitute
involuntary manslaughter at common law, a person who kills another while engaged in
the performance of a lawful act, must be guilty of gross negligence .... Id. at 167
(emphasis added); cf. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 81 S.W. 264 (Ky. 1904).
It is essential to the commission of voluntary manslaughter that the
homicide should have been willfully and intentionally committed, or [should
have been committed] under such circumstances as to strike one at first
blush as so reckless and wanton as to be felonious, though apparently not
intended by the perpetrator.
Id. at 265, quoted in Hawpe v. Commonwealth, 27 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Ky. 1930); Jones,
281 S.W. at 166.
11 See Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1964). "KRS 435.022
specifically removes from the framework of [in]voluntary manslaughter those homicides
resulting from negligence; therefore, the new statute makes inapplicable the cases equat-
ing negligent homicide with [in]voluntary manslaughter, no matter how gross the negli-
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to act. All three of these elements had to exist for an accused
to be acquitted of homicide on the basis of self-defense. Proof
of the first two elements but not the third entitled an accused
to no dispensation under the law, even though a jury might have
thought that he acted under an honest belief in the need for
self-protection. 16
This was the state of homicide and self-defense law in 1974
when the Kentucky General Assembly undertook to adopt a
modem penal code. Substantial change in the law, particularly
the law of self-defense, was on the horizon. This change came
in 1975 on the effective date of the new Kentucky Penal Code. 17
3
The Kentucky Penal Code'" specifically abolished all com-
mon law offenses, 9 defined each crime fully and precisely, and
established penalty ranges for all defined offenses.20 It created
four separate crimes of homicide.
A person commits murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; except
that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this
subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under
the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be ...
or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates
gence." Id. at 226. But see KRS § 435.025 (1970) (the misdemeanor offense of homicide
by negligent operation of a motor vehicle, sometimes referred to as "negligent homi-
cide." Casey v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1958)).
'6 See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1948); Farley v.
Commonwealth, 145 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1940); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.2d
959 (Ky. 1931).
" Ch. 406, § 1, 1974 Ky. Acts 831 (codified at KRS § 500.010 (1975)) (effective
Jan. 1, 1975).
"Id.
" See KRS § 500.020(1) (1975). Unless indicated otherwise, all KRS citations infra
refer to the 1975 replacement.
10 See id. at §§ 532.030, 532.060, 532.090.
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a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the
death of another person.21
A person "intentionally" causes death when he has that result
as "his conscious objective." 22 A person "wantonly" causes
death when he "consciously disregards a substantial and [an]
unjustifiable risk" of death to another that "constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation. ' 23 The penalty for murder is
death24 or imprisonment for "not less than twenty (20) years. '"25
A person commits manslaughter in the first degree when:
(a) With intent to cause serious physical injury [but not
death] to another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person; or
(b) With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance .... 26
The penalty for this offense is imprisonment for "not less than
ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years.''27
Under the Code, "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when he wantonly causes the death of another
21 KRS § 507.020(1). Extreme emotional disturbance replaced the common law
concept of "heat of passion." The common law required "adequate provocation in the
eyes of a reasonable man under the circumstances," Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W.2d 696, 697 (Ky. 1985), while the Code "requires the jury 'to place themselves in
[the defendant's] position as he believed it to be at the time of the act.' " Id. (quoting
Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 108 (Ky. 1980) (emphasis in original), overruled
on other grounds, Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. 1981)). For a
definition of extreme emotional disturbance, see McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715
S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 935 (1987).
- KRS § 501.020(l).
Id. at § 501.020(3). One can commit wanton murder under circumstances which
would have constituted only involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under the
common law. See supra text accompanying note 12. Wanton murder also replaces the
common law concept of felony murder. See Kruse v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 192
(Ky. 1985). Felony murder was an intentional crime: the intent to commit a separate
felony resulting in a killing supplied "the elements of malice and intent" necessary to
constitute murder. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.2d 869, 869 (Ky. 1943).
2 KRS at § 532.030(l); see also id. at § 507.020(2) (situations when murder is a
capital offense).
2 See id. at § 532.060(2)(a).
Id. at § 507.030(1).
27 Id. at § 532.060(2)(b).
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person.' '28 The penalty for this offense is imprisonment for "not
less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years." '29
"A person is guilty of reckless homicide when, with reck-
lessness he causes the death of another person."' 30 A person
"recklessly" causes death "when he fails to perceive a substan-
tial and [an] unjustifiable risk" of death to another that "con-
stitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. ' 31 The penalty
for reckless homicide is imprisonment for "not less than one (1)
year nor more than five (5) years." '32
In dealing with criminal law defenses, the Penal Code used
an approach entirely new to Kentucky law; the legislature un-
dertook to identify and define fully all the circumstances that a
defendant could present as justification or excuse for criminal
conduct. In the area of self-defense, this new approach produced
two very important statutes.
The first one, Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter KRS) sec-
tion 503.050, provides a basic definition of the defense of self-
protection:
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another
person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force
is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use
of unlawful physical force by the other person.
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon
another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when
the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.33
It should be noted that neither section of this statute makes any
reference to the reasonableness of a defendant's belief in the
need for self-protection, an important element of the law of
self-defense prior to the adoption of the Code. 34
24 Id. at § 507.040(l) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 23
("wantonly" causing death).
KRS § 532.060(2)(c).
" Id. at § 507.050(l) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 501.020(4).
32 Id. at § 532.060(2)(d).
2' Id. at § 503.050.
', See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The second important statute, KRS section 503.120(1), states:
When the defendant believes that the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is necessary for any of the
purposes for which such belief would establish a justification
under KRS 503.050 to 503.110 but the defendant is wanton or
reckless in believing the use of any force, or the degree of
force used, to be necessary or in acquiring or failing to acquire
any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability
of his use of force, the justification afforded by those sections
is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which wan-
tonness or recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.35
It should be noted that this statute speaks in terms of "wanton-
ness" and "recklessness" of a defendant's belief and not in
terms of "wantonness" and "recklessness" of a defendant's
conduct toward a victim.
4
To say that KRS sections 503.050 and 503.120(1) have been
a source of difficulty and confusion for Kentucky courts is a
gross understatement.3 6 In addressing this difficulty and confu-
sion, it is necessary first of all to focus on the legislative history
of these provisions, much of which exists without historical
documentation.3 7 In proposing the provisions that ultimately
became KRS sections 503.050 and 503.120, the drafters of the
Penal Code tried to provide more than a mere definition of self-
defense. They also attempted to address a problem involving the
classification for purposes of penalty of at least five types of
homicide.3 8
Under the first type of homicide, the offender intends to
kill, and he acts without any semblance of justification, excuse,
or mitigation. Common law called this culpability "malice afore-
thought" and labeled the homicide as murder. Modern codes
do not use the term "malice aforethought" to describe this
:5 KRS § 503.120(1).
36 See infra notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
3, Dean Lawson was the principal drafter of the Kentucky Penal Code. The
following textual material derives from his thoughts and his recollections as a drafter.
38 The authors classify homicide for illustrative purposes.
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culpability, but they do label a killing of this type as murder,
and treat it as the law's most reprehensible homicide.
The second type of homicide offender intends to kill, but he
acts under circumstances that provide a measure of mitigation
or extenuation (but not justification or excuse) for his conduct.
He is less culpable than the first type and suffers lesser penalties
upon conviction. This second type of homicide was voluntary
manslaughter under the common law.
The third type of homicide involves an actor who intends to
kill, but he acts under a threat of death or serious bodily injury
that is either real or so apparently real that no prudent person
would fail to act in self-protection. The killing may be an
unnecessary act of self-defense, but nothing in the circumstances
indicates that a reasonably prudent person should refrain from
acting. The actor in this instance is free of criminal culpability;
his killing is commonly called justifiable homicide.
Under the fourth type of homicide, the offender intends to
kill, but he acts under a threat of death or serious bodily injury
that is both erroneously perceived and so imprudently held that
no reasonably cautious person would act in self-protection. The
culpability of the offender is contained in the risk of unnecessary
killing which he either consciously disregards or fails to perceive.
The fifth type of homicide offender does not intend to kill,
but he acts under circumstances generating an unreasonable risk
of death to another that either he fails to perceive or he con-
sciously disregards. A typical offender of this type causes death
through gross misconduct in the operation of a motor vehicle
or in the use of a lethal weapon. The law has described the
culpability of this offender with various labels, e.g., "wanton-
ness," "recklessness," and "criminal negligence," and has treated
his conduct as one or more types of involuntary manslaughter.
The primary concern of the Penal Code drafters, as they
worked to formulate provisions on self-defense, centered around
the treatment of homicides committed as a result of erroneous
and flawed beliefs in the need for self-protection, the fourth
type of homicide. Due to the way pre-Code law defined self-
defense, 9 these homicides had the same penalty as those in which
the offender lacked any semblance of justification or excuse, the
39 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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first type described above. Doubts about the fairness of this
grouping generated many questions. What degree of culpability
is involved in a killing that results from an unreasonable belief
in the need for self-protection? Is the essence of the defendant's
guilt in such a killing closely akin to the essence of guilt con-
tained in conduct that creates an unreasonable and an unac-
ceptable risk of harm to others? Is the moral guilt in such a
killing equivalent to the moral guilt of the most reprehensible
of crimes?
In addressing these questions, particularly the last, the draft-
ers of the Code came firmly to believe that a wide difference
exists in the moral blameworthiness of first-type offenders and
fourth-type offenders. The motivation and the driving force for
change in the definition of self-defense derived from this con-
viction.40 The drafters decided to eliminate the possibility of a
murder conviction when the offender has an honest but an
unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection. This decision
was not difficult to reach, for one can easily see that the culp-
ability of the fourth type of homicide is lower in degree than
the culpability of murder. Once this decision was made, however,
the drafters of the Code addressed a question of much greater
difficulty. What is an appropriate penalty classification for the
fourth type of homicide since a murder conviction no longer
would be possible?
The drafters considered two approaches in addressing this
question, each with some support in the law of other jurisdic-
tions. The first approach treats a homicide resulting from an
honest but an unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection
as a form of voluntary manslaughter, 41 an offense that the law
has traditionally reserved for intentional homicides committed
under the extenuating circumstance of passion induced by rea-
,O The same kind of grouping problem existed with respect to the other defenses
of justification, e.g., defense of property, defense of others, and defense of habitation.
Since these other defenses come into play fairly infrequently, the defense of self-
protection was at the focus of attention in the drafting of the new Code. Nevertheless,
the proposed and the adopted adjustment for self-defense applies to all the defenses of
justification that the Code recognizes.
41 See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 114 S.W. 834, 837 (N.C. 1922); Commonwealth v.
Colandro, 80 A. 571, 574 (Pa. 1911); see also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRUnAL LAW
665-66 (2d ed. 1986).
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sonable provocation. 42 To group the fourth type of homicide
with traditional voluntary manslaughter, one must conclude that
the extenuation of a mistaken belief in the need for self-protec-
tion is roughly equivalent to the extenuation of passion induced
by provocation. Only a few authorities have accepted this con-
clusion, using the label of "imperfect self-defense" for the ex-
tenuating circumstance of mistaken belief.
43
The second approach treats a homicide resulting from an
honest but unreasonable belief in personal danger as a form of
criminal negligence or recklessness even though this fourth-type
offender intends the consequences of his act. This approach
equates the fourth type of homicide with the fifth type (the
offender who kills unintentionally through conduct that entails
an unreasonable and an unacceptable risk of death to others).
The American Law Institute, via the Model Penal Code, is the
strongest proponent of this second approach. 44
The drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code found the logic of
the second approach compelling: one who mistakenly kills under
an honest but imprudently held belief in the need for self-
protection is no more culpable than one who inadvertently kills
as a result of gross carelessness in the operation of a motor
vehicle45 or the use of a gun. Moreover, the drafters believed
that the penalties under Kentucky's new Penal Code for an
offense like traditional voluntary manslaughter46 would be too
harsh for the culpability involved in a killing resulting from
"imperfect self-defense." These two beliefs led the drafters to
provide a definition of self-defense which would leave fourth-
type offenders and fifth-type offenders grouped together in a
single category for purposes of penalty.
The method used in the new Code to accomplish this objec-
41 For many years, nearly every jurisdiction defined the extenuation as "heat of
passion" upon "adequate provocation." See R. PEXINs & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
84-85 (3d ed. 1982). Many of the modern codes define it as "extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." E.g., KRS §
507.020(a).
" See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 41, at 665-66.
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962).
41 See supra note 15.
"6 The old voluntary manslaughter crime, see supra note 8 and accompanying text,
became manslaughter in the first degree under the new Code. KRS § 507.030; see supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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tive totally changed the definition of self-defense. 47 In lieu of
the objective approach of the old law (in which reasonableness
of a defendant's belief was an element of the defense), 48 KRS
section 503.050 defines self-defense in. purely subjective terms;
self-defense depends solely on a defendant's subjective belief in
the need for self-protection. 49 In amelioration of the impact of
this change, however, KRS section 503.120(1) denies the defense
of self-protection to a defendant who wantonly or recklessly
forms his belief in the need for self-defense or who wantonly or
recklessly acquires or fails to acquire knowledge pertinent to his
belief.5 0 The impact of KRS section 503.120(1) is limited, how-
ever, since it authorizes conviction only for offenses with wan-
tonness or recklessness as the culpable state of mind.5 1
The intention of the drafters, in making adjustments to the
old law, was clearly stated in the Official Commentary to the
new Penal Code:
In eliminating the requirement that a defendant's belief and
action be reasonable for the defense of self-protection, this
chapter does not necessarily relieve him of all criminal liability
for action based on unreasonable belief. If a defendant is
mistaken in his belief as to the necessity of using force, KRS
503.050 provides him with a defense to all offenses having
"intentional" as the culpable mental state, no matter how
unreasonable his belief. At the same time, if he is "wanton"
or "reckless" in having such a belief, it is possible because of
4 Although this Special Comment focuses on the defense of self-defense, the
drafters made identical changes to all the justification defenses. See, e.g., KRS at §
503.070 (protection of another). Also, note that KRS § 503.120(1) applies to all the
justification defenses.
41 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
49 KRS § 503.050; see supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
SO KRS § 503.120(1); see supra text accompanying note 35.
SI The wantonness and the recklessness limitations of KRS section 503.120 are not
very restrictive. Self-defense involves using force against another that could cause death,
bodily injury, or neither death nor injury. In all three instances, a qualifying offense
exists that requires only a wanton or a reckless state of mind. If death results, a homicide
conviction is possible. See KRS § 507.040 (manslaughter in the second degree); supra
text accompanying notes 28-29; KRS § 507.050 (reckless homicide); supra text accom-
panying notes 30-32. If bodily injury results, the defendant may face an assault convic-
tion. See KRS § 508.030 (assault in the third degree) (currently codified as assault in the
fourth degree). If neither death nor bodily injury results, a wanton endangerment
conviction is possible. See id. at § 508.060 (wanton endangerment in the first degree);
id. at § 508.070 (wanton endangerment in the second degree).
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KRS 503.120 to convict him of an offense having "wanton-
ness" or "recklessness" as the culpable mental state .... As
a consequence of the relationship between KRS 503.050 and
503.120, a person who kills another under a mistaken belief
that his action is necessary for his own protection cannot be
convicted of intentional murder but can be convicted of man-
slaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide if his
mistaken conduct is sufficient to constitute "wantonness" or
"recklessness."52
The drafters' objective was simply to remove killings based on
imperfect claims of self-defense from murder and place them in
categories of homicide more commensurate with the culpability
involved in a killing under a mistaken belief in the need for self-
protection. The drafters did not intend to change the substance
or operation of the law of self-defense in any other respect."
5
The first important case to appear before the Kentucky Su-
preme Court after the enactment of the new self-defense law
was Blake v. Commonwealth. 4 The facts of the case present a
typical set of self-defense circumstances. Evidence of a prior
altercation in which the defendant threatened to kill the victim
existed. On the night of the killing the victim was working at a
business establishment noted for bootlegging activity. The
defendant drove through a drive-in window at this facility, fired
a pistol shot in the direction of the victim, and caused his death.
At trial, the defendant testified that he thought the victim
was reaching for a shotgun or a rifle. No gun was found at the
scene but according to evidence introduced at trial, "[i]t was
generally known that the occupants of this establishment kept a
shotgun just inside the window, and [the defendant] was aware
of this." 55 The defendant attempted to take advantage of the
new self-defense provisions by requesting that the jury be in-
structed to find him guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
or reckless homicide if it believed from the evidence that he had
killed under a wanton or a reckless belief in the need for self-
52 KRS § 503.050 1974 commentary (Baldwin 1984).
" See supra note 37.
607 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1980).
5' Id. at 423.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
protection. The trial judge denied his request;5 6 the jury rejected
his claim of self-defense and convicted him of manslaughter in
the first degree. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed.57
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that under appropriate facts the trial judge should instruct
the jury that a defendant can be convicted of manslaughter in
the second degree or reckless homicide if he was wanton or
reckless in acquiring a belief that the use of deadly physical
force was necessary for self-protection.18 The facts of Blake
qualified as appropriate; KRS section 503.120(1) entitled the
defendant to the instruction. The supreme court quoted a part
of the Commentary to the Penal Code 9 and cited with approval
a suggested instruction from the leading authority on jury in-
structions for Kentucky courtsA0 The Blake decision was com-
pletely routine and unsurprising.
The surprise came four years later in Baker v. Common-
wealth.6 1 At trial, the defendant presented barely a shred of
evidence to support his claim of self-defense. The defendant,
after a stormy marriage, killed his wife in a bar by shooting her
in the back six times with a handgun. The only evidence even
remotely probative of a self-defense claim was testimony that
the victim kept a gun in her purse, kept her purse at the bar,
and began running toward the bar just as the defendant began
36 Id.
' Id. at 422.
'8 Id. at 423-24.
59 Id. (quoting KRS § 503.050 commentary (1974)); see supra note 52 and accom-
panying text.
See I J. PALmoRE & R. LAWSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN KENTUCKY § 10.26
(1975):
Regardless of what the defendant then believed, if you believe from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
(a) That it was not in fact necessary for him to use any physical
force against X in order to protect himself or, if it was, he used more
than-was actually necessary;
AND
(b) That his belief to the contrary and the action he took against
X in reliance upon that belief amounted to:
(i) Reckless conduct, then he was not so privileged, and you
will find him guilty [of reckless homicide] ...
OR
(ii) Wanton conduct, then he was not so privileged, and you
will find him guilty [of second-degree manslaughter] ....
677 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1984).
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shooting. Notwithstanding the lack of genuinely probative evi-
dence, the trial judge instructed the jury on the defense of self-
protection under KRS section 503.050.62 He refused, however,
to give an instruction on reckless homicide requested by the
defendant under the authority of KRS section 503.120(1) on the
theory of a mistaken belief in the need for self-protection. 63 The
jury rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense and convicted
him of murder. On appeal, his sole claim for reversal was the
trial judge's refusal to give a reckless homicide instruction under
the authority of KRS section 503.120(1).64
Why the Kentucky Supreme Court let Baker become a major
self-defense case is somewhat of a mystery. The trial judge was
exceedingly generous in giving a jury instruction on self-protec-
tion; no more than a bare scintilla of credible evidence existed
to support the claim. The instruction on self-defense called for
acquittal of murder if the defendant had a simple belief in the
need for self-protection at the time of the killing, no matter how
unreasonable his belief might have been. Since the jury convicted
the defendant of murder, it must have found that he had no
belief at all in the need for self-defense. Under these circum-
stances, the supreme court could have found that the failure to
give the added instruction on self-defense was not error or that
any error resulting from such a failure was harmless. Rather
than following the easy path, the court chose instead to use
Baker as a vehicle to correct what was perceived as an erroneous
interpretation of the new law on self-defense.
The court provided a lengthy analysis of self-defense and its
relationship to homicide, reviewed the earlier Blake decision,
and affirmed the conviction of Baker for murder. 65 More im-
portantly, it repudiated its previous interpretation of KRS section
503.120(1), overruled Blake, and held that jury instructions on
reckless homicide and manslaughter in the second degree are not
proper when based on evidence that the accused killed under an
unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection. 6 Simply stated,
the court seemed to reason as follows: Self-defense is an inten-
Id. at 878.
6I Id. at 879.
6, Id. at 878.
65 Id.
" Id. at 879.
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tional act; manslaughter in the second degree and reckless hom-
icide are unintentional crimes. An intentional act cannot be the
basis for conviction of an unintentional crime. The court dis-
cussed the language of KRS section 503.120(1) and the Com-
mentary to the Penal Code at length; in the end, however, the
court concluded that "[t]he general assembly did not provide
... for the inclusion of an intentional offense within the defi-
nition of reckless homicide." 67
In Baker, the court sustained a ruling denying a defendant's
request under KRS section 503.120(1) for instructions on the
lower degrees of homicide. The court indicated, however, that
its interpretation of the statute would also apply when a trial
court gives such instructions over the defendant's objection. 68
An opportunity for the court to turn this statement of dictum
into a holding was not long in coming. Less than a year later,
the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Gray v. Commonwealth.69
The homicide in Gray occurred in the defendant's home
during a party in which everyone in attendance was drinking.
At the trial, no question existed over whether the defendant
killed the victim or whether the defendant intended to shoot the
victim. The defendant claimed self-defense in his testimony "be-
cause the victim was in the process of drawing a gun on him at
the time.' '70 The Gray trial occurred after the Blake decision but
before the Baker decision. The trial judge instructed the jury on
second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide (in addition
to murder) on the authority of KRS section 503.120(1) and the
Blake decision; the defendant objected to the instructions on the
lesser offenses. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-
degree manslaughter, presumably on the basis of a determination
that he had killed under a wanton belief in the need to use
deadly force for self-protection. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
reviewed the defendant's conviction before the Baker decision
and affirmed on the basis of Blake.71 Upon review, the Kentucky
Supreme Court repeated much of its Baker analysis and reversed
67Id.
6 Id. at 880.
9 695 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1985).




the conviction. The following statement summarizes the court's
thoughts fairly well:
These instructions were erroneous for the reason that they
permitted the jury to find movant guilty of second-degree
manslaughter if his belief in the necessity to use deadly force
to protect himself was unreasonable. As we held in Baker v.
Commonwealth ... , an unreasonable belief concerning the
necessity of self-defense is not a factor in the statutory defi-
nition of second-degree manslaughter. To constitute second-
degree manslaughter a person must be guilty of wanton con-
duct, he must act without intention to kill....
6
The defendant Gray was never retried following the Kentucky
Supreme Court's reversal of his conviction. In accordance with
the United States Supreme Court's ruling that a retrial for the
primary offense after a reversal of a conviction for a lesser
included offense constitutes double jeopardy, 73 the defendant
was released from bond and set free.7 4 In two other homicide
cases resolved on the basis of Baker and Gray, the end result
was identical: the defendants were released without retrials on
the merits. 5 In these two cases, the defendants relied on self-
defense as "battered wives." Following convictions for man-
slaughter in the second degree, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed because no evidence indicated that the killings were
unintentional. 7 6 With double jeopardy barring a retrial on charges
of murder or manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant in
each case walked free. The results in these cases, compelled by
the ruling in Baker, could easily cause one to believe that the
ends of justice were defeated. At the very least, these cases
underscore the significance of the issue that this Special Com-
ment addresses.
72 Id. at 862.
7 See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
14 Commonwealth v. Gray, No. 82-CR-001 (Cir. Ct. Lee County, Ky. review Oct.
18, 1985).
71 Commonwealth v. Ford, No. 85-CR-072 (Cir. Ct. Fayette County, Ky. acquittal
Jan. 13, 1987); Commonwealth v. Lafollette, No. 83-CR-001 (Cir. Ct. Larue County,
Ky. acquittal April 7, 1986).
76 Ford v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Lafollette v.
Commonwealth, No. 84-CA-563-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion).
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Determining the full impact of Baker and Gray on the de-
fense of self-protection as defined in the Penal Code is difficult
because the Kentucky Supreme Court's interpretation of what
KRS section 503.120(1) does not say as well as what the statute
does say is unclear. One can interpret Baker and Gray in at least
two ways, neither of which leaves the law in a rational posture.
The only provision in the Code that gives an accused a basis
for claiming self-defense is KRS section 503.050. The defense
defined by this statute is absolute, entitling an accused to ex-
oneration on the sole basis of a subjective belief in the need for
self-protection. KRS section 503.120(1) purports to qualify this
absolute defense by declaring the defense unavailable when the
defendant's subjective belief is wantonly or recklessly mistaken.
According to the supreme court, however, the Kentucky General
Assembly did not define the lesser degrees of homicide (those
committed through wantonness or recklessness) to include kill-
ings with a wanton or a reckless belief in the need for self-
protection, thereby leaving the qualifying element of KRS section
503.120(1) unimplemented and the absolute defense of KRS sec-
tion 503.050 fully intact. This interpretation of Baker and Gray
leads to the absurd conclusion that a killing under a belief in
the need for self-protection is totally free of criminal liability,
no matter how grossly mistaken and unreasonable the belief
might have been. No jurisdiction has ever contemplated such a
lenient treatment for one who kills another person.
A second interpretation of Baker and Gray is plausible, based
upon a literal reading of some language used by the supreme
court in construing KRS 503.120. In Baker, the court stated:
K.R.S. 503.120 provides that an unreasonable belief that the
use of force is necessary for self protection which would es-
tablish justification for an intentional act pursuant to K.R.S.
503.050 cannot be used as justification in a prosecution where
wantonness or recklessness suffices to establish culpability. The
commentary points out that while an unreasonable but actual
belief in the necessity to use physical force for self protection
will justify an intentional act, it cannot be used to justify a
wanton or reckless act.7
" Baker, 677 S.W.2d at 878.
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Finding jury instructions on manslaughter in the second degree
and reckless homicide inappropriate for an intentional killing
under an unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection, the
court in Gray said:
[B]y reason of K.R.S. 503.120, if a defendant believes that it
is necessary to use deadly force to protect himself but that
belief is found by a jury to be unreasonable, the defense of
self-protection is not available as a defense to nonintentional
crimes for which wantonness or recklessness suffices to estab-
lish culpability.78
Since the supreme court had held previously that self-protection
is available as a defense to a wanton or a reckless crime, 79 the
court's statements in Baker and Gray can be interpreted to mean
that KRS section 503.120(1) limits the availability of self-defense
in wanton or reckless cases to situations in which the defendant's
belief in the need for self-protection is reasonable.80 Under this
interpretation the defense of self-protection would exist for an
intentional crime solely on the basis of the defendant's belief (a
purely subjective standard), but would exist for an unintentional
crime only when the belief is reasonable (an objective standard).
Major problems exist with both of these interpretations of
Baker and Gray. The first leads to unqualified disaster for the
law of homicide. The second does not correspond to the Code's
definition of self-defense in KRS section 503.050, and in at least
some instances, this interpretation leaves the law of homicide
only slightly more rational than it would be under the first
interpretation.
8
Floyd Butler came to trial in early 1986 after the Baker and
Gray decisions. The trial court instructed the jury on all four
homicide offenses: murder and manslaughter in the first degree
on the basis of evidence indicating that he intended to cause
Gray, 695 S.W.2d at 862.
79 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1983).
10 Cf. Russell v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (The court
reversed a conviction for assiult in the second degree because the trial court gave ihe
Blake jury instructions. The court held that, in the absence of any evidence that the
assault was unintentional, the reasonableness of the defendant's belief was immaterial.).
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
death and manslaughter in the second degree and reckless hom-
icide on the basis of the evidence indicating that he did not
intend to cause death. The judge then instructed the jury on
self-defense substantially as follows:
A. Even though you might otherwise find the defendant
guilty of intentional murder or first degree manslaughter, if
you believe from the evidence that at the time he killed Gerald
Miller (if he did so) he believed that Miller was about to use
physical force upon him, he was privileged to use such physical
force against Miller as he believed to be necessary in order to
protect himself against it, but including the right to use deadly
physical force only if he believed it to be necessary in order
to protect himself from death or serious physical injury at the
hands of Miller.
B. Even though you might otherwise find the defendant
guilty of second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide, if
you believe from the evidence that at the time he killed Gerald
Miller (if he did so) he had a reasonable belief that Miller was
about to use physical force upon him, he was privileged to use
such physical force against Miller as he reasonably believed to
be necessary in order to protect himself against it, including
the right to use deadly physical force in so doing only if he
had a reasonable belief that it was necessary in order to protect
himself from death or serious physical injury at the hands of
Miller.8'
These instructions were based on the second interpretation of
Baker and Gray; if the jury believed the killing was uninten-
tional, then Butler's belief in the need to use deadly force in
self-protection had to be reasonable, but if the jury believed the
killing was intentional, Butler's belief in the need for self-pro-
tection would suffice for self-defense even though unreasonable.
During the third hour of jury deliberations, Butler's counsel
approached the judge and remarked: "Judge, under the self-
defense instructions, the defendant would be better off if the
jury disbelieves his testimony and finds that he killed the victim
intentionally. " 8 2 Right! Under the facts of the case, the jury
could disbelieve the testimony of the defendant and find that he
killed the victim intentionally while acting under an unreasonable




belief in the need for self-protection. Under "Instruction A,"
drafted to comply with KRS section 503.050, the jury would be
required to exonerate Butler and set him free. On the other
hand, the jury could believe Butler's testimony and find that he
killed unintentionally while acting under an unreasonable belief
in the need for self-protection. Under "Instruction B," the jury
must find him guilty of either manslaughter in the second degree
or reckless homicide. In other words, a defendant who kills
intentionally receives a more lenient treatment under the law
than one who kills without intention. A defendant who kills
intentionally is entitled to be unreasonable; a defendant who
kills without intention is not.
9
The trial of Floyd Butler proves either that the law in this
important area has simply lost its direction and logic or that the
law of self-defense and homicide has become so complex and
confusing that competent trial judges face insuperable obstacles
in trying to administer trials. Currently, trial judges complain
loudly about a lack of understanding of the appellate decisions,
and they thirst for some clarity. A trial judge's primary respon-
sibility is to give proper instructions on the law. As Gray and
the two "battered wife" cases demonstrate, the use of once
proper/now improper instructions coupled with the constitu-
tional proscription against double jeopardy can result in exon-
eration of a convicted killer without the possibility of retrial on
the merits. Defense attorneys may want the judge to give im-
proper jury instructions, thereby creating grounds for reversal
in the event of a conviction. A writer for the in-house journal
of Kentucky's Department of Public Advocacy asserts that at
least one case exists to support any fact situation and any
argument a defendant wants to make.83 Although the defendant
in Baker objected and appealed because the judge failed to give
an instruction that was less favorable than the instruction ac-
tually -given, undoubtedly the defendant would have objected
and appealed if the judge had given the less favorable instruc-
tion. Facing this dilemma, trial judges may be tempted to give
,1 Kallaher, Self Defense, ADVOCATE, A BI-MONTIMY PUBLICATION OF THE DPA,
June 1987, at 27, 33.
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a defendant whatever instruction he wants, hoping that the jury
will do what is right.
How did the law of self-defense and homicide become so
problematic and difficult almost immediately after the adoption
of a new penal code? What is the best way to eliminate the
problems and chart a better course for this part of the law?
Perhaps a look at the first of these questions may provide an
answer to the second.
The objective of the legislature, in enacting KRS sections
503.050 and 503.120(1), was to address a narrow and uncompli-
cated problem. The Commentary to the Kentucky Penal Code
attempts to make this intention clear . 4 The two statutes have
proved nonetheless to be very difficult to comprehend and apply.
Much of this difficulty is seemingly traceable to some fairly
small but critical flaws in the construction of the Code's lan-
guage each of which has added unnecessary complexity and
confusion to the law.
One misconception is that a homicide offender's state of
mind can be measured in terms of its relationship to the offend-
er's act. In most instances, the state of mind of such an offender
is measured in terms of its relationship to the result of his act
(namely, the death of the victim). 5 In one very important in-
stance, the state of mind of a homicide offender is measured in
terms of its relationship to a circumstance involved in the of-
fender's conduct.8 6 In no instance, however, do the provisions
of the Code allow the culpable mental state for homicide to be
measured in relationship to an offender's act.87
See KRS §§ 503.050, 503.120 1974 commentary (Baldwin 1984).
- For example, murder occurs when one intentionally causes the death of another,
ie., the actor has death as his conscious objective. Manslaughter in the second degree
occurs when one consciously disregards a substantial and an unjustifiable risk of death
to another. In measuring the actor's mental state in these situations, the focus is on his
state of mind in relationship to the death that he has caused.
16 See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
7 This follows from a careful examination of KRS chapter 507 on homicide and
KRS § 501.020, the provision defining the Code's mental states. The Code uses only
four mental states to define crimes: "intentionIally," "knowingly," "wantonly," and
"recklessly." Each is defined so that it can be used in relationship to three different
kinds of elements: the result of conduct, conduct itself, and circumstances surrounding
conduct. The chapter on homicide uses all but the mental state of "knowingly" in
defining homicide offenses. By examining the definition of "intentionally" in KRS
501.020, one can see that it is designed for use in relationship to (i) the result of conduct
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One must read the self-defense cases carefully to understand
the extent to which the supreme court has let its analysis get a
bit off track by focusing upon the mental state of the accused
in relationship to his act. For example, the court stated in Baker:
The general assembly did not provide, however, for the inclu-
sion of an intentional offense within the definition of reckless
homicide. We cannot escape the fact that an act claimed to be
done in self defense is an intentional act. It is not a "reckless"
act as that term is defined by statute.88
In Gray, the court declared: "It is without question that the
movant intended to shoot the victim. He admitted the shooting
and attempted to justify it on the ground of self-protection.
There is no evidence whatever that his actions were anything
other than intentional."8 9 This flawed analysis has added signif-
icantly to the complexity and confusion in the law of self-
defense. More importantly, it seems to have played a major role
in the court's pivotal Baker ruling that the homicide statutes of
Kentucky cannot be construed to treat a killing under an imper-
fect claim of self-defense as either manslaughter in the second
degree or reckless homicide.
A second misconception which has appeared in the opinions
of the supreme court is that the defense of self-protection is not
as applicable to unintentional crimes as it is to intentional crimes. 90
For example, the court in Baker pointed out: "We cannot escape
the fact that an act claimed to be done in self-defense is an
intentional act. It is not a 'reckless' act as that term is defined
by statute." 91 In addition, the court stated recently:
[This Court cannot escape the fact that an act claimed to be
and (ii) conduct itself; it is not defined for use with respect to a circumstance, obviously
because the offender does not intend a circumstance. By examining the homicide offenses
in Chapter 507, one can see that "intentionally" is used only in relationship to the result
of death. By examining the definitions of "wantonly" and "recklessly" one can see that
they are designed for use only in relationship to the result of conduct and circumstances
surrounding conduct but not in relationship to conduct itself. Therefore, the Code never
measures the culpable mental state of a homicide offender in relationship to his conduct.
U Baker, 677 S.W.2d at 87.9 (emphasis added).
9 Gray, 695 S.W.2d at 861 (emphasis added).
, But see Thompson, 652 S.W.2d at 78.
Baker, 677 S.W.2d at 879.
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done in self-defense is intentional. It is not reckless as that
term is defined by the statute.
There is no question that [the defendant's] act of shooting
was intentional. The instructions on specific offenses should
be limited to intentional crimes.92
These statements imply that self-defense belongs exclusively to
the realm of intentional crimes. Neither legal authority nor logic
supports such a position.
Limiting self-defense to intentional crimes would lead clearly
to irrational results. The following hypothetical is illustrative.
Suppose that a sober man encounters a threat of death or serious
bodily injury from a drunken man wielding a knife. Without
intending to kill or to injure, the sober man shoots at the feet
of the drunken man in an attempt to thwart the threat; however,
the gunshot ricochets off the pavement and causes the death of
the drunken man. Believing that the sober man acted impru-
dently (and thus criminally) in causing this death, a grand jury
indicts him for manslaughter in the second degree or reckless
homicide; it refuses to indict him for murder due to the absence
of an intent to kill. Although no doubt exists that the offender's
act of shooting was intentional, the indictment charges uninten-
tional homicide. Does this mean that the offender cannot claim
the defense of self-defense? The answer is surely no, unless one
concludes that an actor trying to defend himself without causing
another's death is more culpable than one who tries to defend
himself by intentionally causing the death of another.
A third misconception about the Penal Code's provisions on
homicide' and self-defense dwarfs the prior ones in terms of
importance. Under the Code, a person may wantonly or reck-
lessly cause the death of another through gross carelessness in
assessing the need for self-protection and may be guilty of man-
slaughter. in the second degree or reckless homicide even though
he acts with an intent to kill. The supreme court's failure to
recognize this proposition is more responsible for the self-defense
problem that this Special Comment addresses than all other
factors combined. Treating intentional homicide under concepts




traditionally reserved for only unintentional homicides has proved
very troublesome for the court. The difficulty has surfaced most
noticeably in the court's attempt to ascertain the legislature's
intention in adopting KRS sections 503.050 and 503.120(1).
The new Kentucky Penal Code came into existence at the
beginning of 1975. In 1980, the supreme court reviewed the Blake
case. The court construed the self-defense provisions of the Code
to reflect a legislative intent consistent with the proposition that
an offender may be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
or reckless homicide even though he acts with an intent to kill.
It may have been significant that two members of the court
which reviewed Blake, Chief Justice Palmore and Justice Lu-
kowsky, were members of the Advisory Committee that prepared
a draft of the new Penal Code for the legislature's consideration.
Four years later, when Baker arrived for review, the court
had five new members and a very different viewpoint about
legislative intent:
The general assembly did not provide... for the inclusion
of an intentional offense within the definition of reckless hom-
icide....
Statutes which create criminal offenses should do so in
express terms and criminal liability should not rest upon im-
plication or inference as to what the General Assembly in-
tended but did not expressly state. 93
The court in Baker examined the pertinent provisions of the
Code at length and overruled Blake, holding that manslaughter
in the second degree and reckless homicide are not appropriate
for intentional killings.
10
Three years have passed since the decision in Baker. The
case continues to be troublesome, even for the supreme court.
The court has reexamined its position in two recent cases. Com-
monwealth v. Rose94 involved a claim of self-defense by a "bat-
91 Baker, 677 S.W.2d at 879-80.
- 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987). The court decided Rose on January 22, 1987, only




tered wife." After killing her husband and being charged with
murder, the defendant admitted in her testimony to shooting the
victim intentionally in what she claimed to be a perceived need
for self-protection. The trial judge gave jury instructions similar
to those that the supreme court approved in Blake but disap-
proved in Baker and Gray.95 Under the guidance of these instruc-
tions, the jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter in the
second degree.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction and
reversed, presumably under the authority of Baker and Gray.96
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
reinstated the verdict, and made a statement about legislative
intent that seems to be substantially at odds with its earlier
position: "The Penal Code was intended to provide Manslaugh-
ter II as a lesser homicide offense to murder to punish an
unjustified killing under circumstances such as this which war-
rant a conclusion of diminished culpability, but do not warrant
exoneration. ' 97 The Rose decision was unanimous, but a con-
curring opinion leaves little doubt that disagreement over the
matter of legislative intent continues to influence the court's
deliberations .98
By adopting KRS sections 503.050 and 503.120(1), thereby
eliminating the possibility of a murder conviction for a killing
under an imperfect claim of self-defense, the Kentucky General
Assembly clearly intended to group intentional killings of this
type with homicide offenses previously reserved for only unin-
tenitional killings. Although the legislature perhaps could have
manifested its intention in a more emphatic fashion, the self-
defense and homicide statutes are susceptible to an interpretation
fully compatible with legislative intent. The opinion in Rose,
notwithstanding its failure to overrule Baker and Gray, offered
some hope that the supreme court might slide into alignment
with legislative intent, but that changed when the court made its
11 See supra note 60.
9 Commonwealth v. Rose, No. 85-CA-2223-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 1986)
(unpublished opinion).
9 Rose, 725 S.W.2d at 592.
91 Justice Vance concurred in the result in Rose by distinguishing the prior cases
on their facts. Id. at 593.
[VOL. 76
SELF-DEFENSE IN KENTUCKY
most recent statement on the subject in Smith v. Common-
wealth .99
The problem in Smith did not touch the law of self-defense
even remotely. Nonetheless, both sides of a divided court ad-
dressed the issue. Writing for the majority, Justice Vance, the
author of the Baker and Gray opinions and the Rose concur-
rence, minimized the importance of Rose:
The precedential value of Baker has been eroded by our deci-
sion in Commonwealth v. Rose ... in which we upheld a
conviction of second-degree manslaughter where the defense
offered was self-protection, but the defendant contended that
she did not intend to cause the death of the victim. Because
intentional murder requires intention to cause death, under the
circumstances in Rose, a jury could have believed that the
defendant shot her husband, believing it necessary for her self-
protection, but that she did not actually intend to cause his
death. The circumstances were such, however, that the jury
could believe that her conduct was wanton as defined by statute
in that she was aware of and consciously disregarded a sub-
stantial risk that death would result. Thus, the instruction on
second-degree manslaughter was proper. ' o
In dissent, Justice Leibson, who had written the court's opinion
in Rose after disagreeing with the majority in both Baker and
Gray, spoke more generally and more emphatically:
The approved practice in homicide cases in this jurisdiction
until the advent of Baker and Gray, and the better practice,
was for the trial court's instructions to present the jury with a
menu of offenses, covering every arguable mental state, con-
flicting or not, and let the jury, as a trier of fact, decide which
offense best described the circumstances of the killing. ...
As attested by the present opinion, the opposite approach
simply creates confusion and then compounds it.'
The Smith holding takes nothing from nor adds anything to the
earlier decisions on self-defense. Nevertheless, the case is signif-
11 737 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1987).
oo Id. at 687-88.
,0, Id. at 690 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (citing Blake, 607 S.W.2d at 422).
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icant because it leaves no doubt that disagreement reigns in the
chambers of the only court with the authority to solve the
problems that have engulfed this very important area of Ken-
tucky law.
11
What is to be done? The status quo is obviously undesirable.
Perhaps the Kentucky General Assembly should address the
problem with new legislation. The cases suggest that the existing
statutes may be too complicated to be functional and that leg-
islative intervention is unavoidable. Assuming this to be true,
there are at least four options deserving of consideration by the
General Assembly.
The first option is to restore the law to its existence prior to
the adoption of the new Code. Only minor adjustments in ex-
isting statutes would be necessary to implement this change in
the law. The legislature could repeal KRS section 503.120(1) and
amend KRS section 503.050 (along with other defenses of jus-
tification sections) to require reasonable grounds for beliefs which
justify the use of force against another.
A majority of states probably still include in the definition
of self-defense (and other defenses of justification) the age-old
requirement of reasonableness in the defendant's beliefs. 10 2 Some
states simply have not put the old common-law rule under scru-
tiny; others have retained the traditional approach after thought
and deliberation. The strength of this first option is in its fa-
miliarity and simplicity. Its fundamental weakness is that a
person who kills in cold blood and one who kills with an
unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection are grouped
together for purposes of penalty.
Several questions are pertinent to the merits of this option.
Does a significant difference exist between the culpability of a
person who kills in cold blood and the culpability of one who
kills with an unreasonable belief in the need for self-protection?
Does the murder penalty range, i.e., twenty years to life, accom-
modate the culpability differences that may exist between the
two offenders? Does the strength of the traditional rule outweigh
the need for a more equitable treatment of offenders? In 1974,
' See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 457.
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the Kentucky General Assembly considered these questions and
rejected the traditional rule. The only new development since
1974 is a vividly demonstrated difficulty with the Code's ap-
proach.
A second legislative option would involve the use of man-
slaughter in the first degree (common-law voluntary manslaugh-
ter) as the crime committed by intentional offenders who kill
under an imperfect claim of self-defense. To implement this
change, the legislature would repeal KRS section 503.120(1) and
expand the definition of manslaughter in the first degree to
include the offender who intentionally kills under an unreason-
able belief in the need for self-protection. Illinois and Wisconsin
have adopted this approach in comprehensive modernizations of
their criminal codes. 10 3
This option would alleviate the problem of having two vastly
different offenders in a single category of homicide for penalty
purposes. It. would leave most of the traditional law of self-
defense intact and thus retain much simplicity. On the other
hand, it would not address the full scope of the problem that
existed under the traditional law. For example, an offender who
assaults someone under an unreasonable belief in the need for
self-protection (without causing death) would not find in the law
of assault the favorable treatment he would find in the law of
homicide. Also, the second option would not address the prob-
lem of offenders who kill under imperfect claims of defense of
property, habitation, or effecting arrest; the existing provisions
of the Kentucky Code do not contain such weaknesses. The
second option, in other words, would be neither as complete
nor as logical as KRS sections 503.050 and 503.120(1). However,
it would provide relief from the complexity of the existing law.
As a third option, the legislature could accept a suggestion
made by the supreme court in Baker and expand the definition
of reckless homicide to include the offender who kills another
under a mistaken and an unreasonable belief in the need for
self-protection. 1 4 If the legislature believes that the penalty for
reckless homicide is inadequate, it could expand the definition
03 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.05 (West 1982).
10 See Baker, 677 S.W.2d at 879.
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of manslaughter in the second degree to include this offender.
Once again, the legislature would need to repeal KRS section
503.120(1) and amend KRS section 503.050.
Except to the extent that this option provides lower penalties,
it is not very different from the second option. It may match
culpability of offenders better than the second option, since a
mistaken killing in self-defense seems more closely akin to an
inadvertent killing through gross carelessness than to an emo-
tional killing under provocation. It would provide a less complex
approach to self-defense than existing law provides. However,
like the second option, it would not be as complete or as logical
as the existing Kentucky statutes.
As a fourth option, the legislature could amend KRS section
503.120(1) to express legislative intent more clearly than it was
expressed in the Penal Code in 1974. The amended statute would
state:
When the defendant believes that the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is necessary for any of the
purposes for which such belief would establish a justification
under KRS 503.050 to 503.110 but the defendant is wanton or
reckless in believing the use of any force, or the degree of
force used, to be necessary or in acquiring or failing to acquire
any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability
of his use of force, the defendant may not be convicted of an
offense for which intention is required to establish culpability
(because of the availability of a defense of justification as
defined in this chapter), but he may be convicted of a lesser
offense for which wantonness or recklessness, as the case may
be, suffices to establish culpability.
Hopefully, this option would resolve the supreme court's diffi-
culty with existing self-defense and homicide provisions of the
Code.
12
This Special Comment should not end without making a case
for the existing statutes. The Kentucky General Assembly and
the drafters of the new Code had a sound objective in 1974.




The unreasonableness of an alleged belief quite properly is
considered as evidence that it was not in fact held, but if the
tribunal is satisfied that the belief was held, the defendant, in
a prosecution for crime founded on wrongful [intention], should
be entitled to be judged as if his belief was [sic] true. To
convict for a belief arrived at on an unreasonable ground is
to convict for negligence. Where the crime otherwise requires
greater culpability for a conviction, it is neither fair nor logical
to convict when there is only negligence as to the circumstances
that would establish a justification.
... In homicide, for example, the distinction between
[intentional] and reckless homicide has enormous import when
it comes to the degree of the offense and to'the sentence. And
it makes more sense to assimilate the defendant who is reckless
as to the existence of justifying circumstances to one who
recklessly takes life than to assimilate him to one who [inten-
tionally] does so. 105
The current statutory scheme of KRS sections 503.050 and
503.120(1) establishes a sound framework within which to resolve
self-defense claims. The statutory scheme is fair because it groups
offenders according to culpability, logical because it treats all
defenses of justification identically, and complete because all
offenses involving force against another person (homicide, as-
sault, and attempt) trigger an application of the same set of self-
defense rules. The existing statutes are undoubtedly more com-
plex than the traditional law of self-defense, but they are work-
able.
A clarifying opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court is
essential. The court needs to reexamine the relationship between
homicide and imperfect claims of self-defense with the following
vitally important point about KRS section 503.120 clearly in
mind: In construing this statute courts must focus attention on
the offender's mistaken belief in the need for self-protection,
for it is this mistaken belief that provides the culpability for his
crime. The homicide and self-defense statutes are less perplexing
and more functional from this perspective.
Manslaughter in the second degree occurs when one "wan-
tonly causes the death of another,"' 6 and reckless homicide
o MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 comment at 151-52 (1985).
10 KRS § 507.040.
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occurs when, "with recklessness [one] causes the death of an-
other "107 The Code defines "wantonly" and "recklessly" as
follows:
A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circum-
stance described by a statute defimng an offense when he is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disre-
gard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware
thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts
wantonly with respect thereto.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to
a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when
he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must
be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a rea-
sonable person would observe in the situation. 0 8
Under these definitions, a person may act culpably with respect
to a result described by a statute defining an offense or with
respect to a circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense.
With imperfect self-defense, the offender's culpability stems
from his mistaken belief in the need for self-protection. A belief
of this type is not a "result described by a statute", it is a
"circumstance described by a statute."0 9 More importantly, the
belief is a circumstance that KRS section 503.120 describes in
defining criminal offenses-specifically, homicide and assault
resulting from the use of force under a false and an unreasonably
held belief in the need for self-protection. Considering the def-
initions of "wantonly" and "recklessly" with respect to this
circumstance (something the Kentucky Supreme Court has failed
to do) results in a clear and workable descnption of homicide
offenses for killings under imperfect claims of self-defense.
Io d. at § 507.050.




A killing under a belief in the need for self-protection would
be manslaughter in the second degree upon a showing of the
following elements: (i) the defendant acted in the face of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of mistaken belief in the need
for self-protection; (ii) he was aware of and consciously disre-
garded the risk that he was mistaken in his belief; and (iii) in
acting, he grossly deviated from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would have observed in the same situation. A
killing under a belief in the need for self-protection would be
reckless homicide upon a showing of the following elements: (i)
the defendant acted in the face of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of mistaken belief in the need for self-protection; (ii) before
acting, he failed to perceive the risk that he was mistaken in his
belief; and (iii) in acting, he grossly deviated from the standard
of conduct that a reasonable person would have observed in the
same situation.
13
What about Floyd Butler9 How did the jury handle the
intentional/unreasonable and unintentional/reasonable dichot-
omy of that case?
The jury never reached the self-defense issue. Disbelieving
that Butler acted in self-protection, the jury found him guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree and fixed his pumshment at
seven years imprisonment. The verdict was reportedly a compro-
mise among six jurors who believed that Butler intended to kill
the victim but acted under extreme emotional disturbance, four
jurors who believed he killed Gerald Miller without intent to
cause death, and two jurors who believed that a man's home is
his castle.
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